THE PAYMENT OF TRIBUTE, A DUTY OF STRICT MORAL OBLIGATION.

A

DISCOURSE,

DELIVERED IN THE PARISH CHURCH OF SHEFFIELD,

(Pursuant to the Will of the late Dr. Waterhouse,)

On the 30th of January, 1799,

Being the Anniversary of the Martyrdom of King Charles I.

To which are annexed,

SOME SHORT OBSERVATIONS ON THE WORD

"LOYALTY,"

In answer to Mr. Urban's Reviewer.

BY

GEORGE SMITH, A. M.

Curate of the said Church, and late of Trinity College, Cambridge.

SHEFFIELD:

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TO THE

TWELVE CAPITAL BURGESSES

OF THE

TOWN OF SHEFFIELD,

(TRUSTEES OF DR. WATERHOUSE's BEQUEST,)

THE

FOLLOWING DISCOURSE

IS

MOST RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED,

BY THEIR OBEDIENT,

HUMBLE SERVANT,

THE PREACHER.

BROAD LANE, FEBRUARY 4, 1799.

John Hall Ickles

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SECOND EDIT. JANUARY 1799.

A Diſcourſe, &c.

ROMANS, CHAP. xiii. VER. 6. *(former part.)*

" *For this Cauſe* (i. e. for conſcience ſake) *pay ye tribute alſo.*"

THAT there is a gradation in the guilt, or in the inherent turpitude of the ſeveral crimes which reaſonable creatures are capable of committing; that ſome implicate a greater degree of moral depravity in the agent, and are more injurious to ſociety at large than others, cannot be denied or doubted. The ſame crime, indeed, in different perſons, ſo far as regards the individual who commits that crime, may be of different degrees of heinouſneſs: or, in other words, the exact meaſure of his perſonal culpability muſt depend on innumerable contingent circumſtances, which none can underſtand or comprehend but God alone. And this ought to teach us charity in judging of our neighbours. But every ſpecies

of crime may be conſidered abſtractedly, without any reference to the particular caſe of individuals, as having in itſelf, *ſuo genere*, a diſtinct character, an appropriate degree of intrinſic malignity and miſchievous tendency.—Would to God that they were always ſo conſidered—according to their real nature—according to the degree of their inherent turpitude and injurioufneſs to ſociety at large; and not according to the ſyſtems of vain philoſophy, the dictates of ſelf-love, the cuſtoms of the world, and the prejudices of mere opinion!

Let us briefly examine theſe four ſources of deluſion, in eſtimating the relative guiltineſs of human actions.

And firſt, with reſpect to the ſyſtems of vain philoſophy. While the moſt learned caſuiſts of the preſent, as well as of former times, are not agreed as to the very foundation of natural morality—ſome maintaining that it originates from the will of God, deducible from His works of nature and providence, others from the fitneſs of things—ſome from expediency or general utility, and others from moral ſentiment or the inward feeling and perception of conſcience—it is no wonder that they ſhould differ yet more widely in erecting the ſuperſtructure, in determining the ſcale of virtues, and, conſequently, of their oppoſite vices. This, accordingly, has happened: ſo

far, that the very ſame action which has been eſteemed by one virtuous and praiſe-worthy, has been called by another infamous and criminal. The event we this day commemorate is an example ſtrikingly in point. But is there, therefore, no diſtinction between right and wrong?

Again, ſecondly: The ſame frailty, which occaſions our committing any crime, will alſo further incline us ever to regard our own particular ſins with greater indulgence than others from which we are exempt, but which we obſerve in our brethren of mankind. Hence it comes to paſs, that almoſt every man (as it has often been remarked) has three diſtinct characters: one, which he forms of himſelf—another, which he bears in the world—and a third, his real character, ſuch as it appears in the ſight of God. But, however the two former may correſpond with, or differ from each other and from the latter, this only is his real and true character; which is determined, not by what he thinks of himſelf, or by what his neighbours think or ſay concerning him, but by the real merit or demerit of his actions, according to their ſeveral gradations in virtue or criminality.

Again: The cuſtom of the world, or the frequency and unconcern with which we obſerve any crime to be committed, has a wonderful effect in leſſening our abhorrence of it;

but cannot make any, the leaſt alteration in its real nature. However common and faſhionable may be the crimes of ſeduction, fornication, adultery, duelling, drunkenneſs, gaming, profane ſwearing and perjury, this does not abate one tittle of their intrinſic malignity or miſchievous tendency. The gradation of guilt, of the inherent turpitude of the ſeveral crimes which reaſonable creatures are capable of committing, is fixed and immutable. In exact proportion as they implicate moral depravity in the agent, and are injurious to ſociety at large, they are criminal—and offenſive to God, infinitely pure and benevolent.

Once more: With reſpect to the prejudice of opinion. It is ſaid in general, that "to him that thinketh any thing to be unlawful, to him it is ſin." This is true. But it does not, therefore, follow, that "whatever a man may think to be lawful or allowable is therefore juſt and right." The perſonal culpability of the offender may be greater or leſs, according to the means he may have poſſeſſed of learning his duty, the ſuddenneſs or violence of the temptation, and, as I ſaid before, innumerable contingent circumſtances. But the abſtract nature of the action remains ſtill the ſame. In proportion as it implicates moral depravity in the agent, however that depravity has been produced, whether by his fault or misfortune, and in proportion as it is injurious to ſociety at large, whether that injury is fore-

ſeen and intended by him or not, it is in itſelf a crime, poſſeſſing and involving a ſpecific degree of guilt and inherent turpitude.

I thought it right to lay before you this (however ſhort and imperfect) view of the eſſential nature of criminality in the actions of reaſonable beings, before I proceed to apply theſe general principles to that particular ſpecies of crime or offence, to the conſideration of which we are invited by the words of our text, and the peculiar circumſtances of the preſent times: I mean—the fraudulently withholding our juſt ſhare of contribution to the public expences of the ſtate—the making no conſcience of paying tribute! To advert again to the four heads I méntioned above: we may obſerve, that ſcarcely any crime is more countenanced by the new and falſe philoſophy of the age. In this matter, above moſt others, we are biaſſed in our judgment by the dictates of ſelf-love, and by a narrow, ſhort-ſighted, partial regard to our own intereſt. No offence is, perhaps, more common, and, therefore, regarded with leſs abhorrence; and concerning none is the prejudice of mere opinion ſuffered in ſo many ways to operate againſt the plaineſt dictates of truth and juſtice.

In the firſt place, I ſay, it is countenanced by the new and falſe philoſophy of the age. From the days of Sir Thomas More, but more eſpecially of late years, both real and

pretended philoſophers have beſtowed much pains in inveſtigating the origin and progreſs of civil ſociety; and, according to their ſeveral notions on this head, have diſputed vehemently concerning the ſuperior legitimacy and excellence of this or that particular form of government: ſo vehemently, indeed, as to deny that allegiance was due, or the payment of tribute to be conſidered as of moral obligation, unleſs under their own peculiar and favourite ſyſtem. That ſome forms of government are more legitimate and excellent than others, providing more effectually "for the puniſhment of evil doers, and the protection and praiſe of them that do well," will not admit of diſpute. But any, even the worſt, if by this we are to underſtand the moſt deſpotic government on earth, is preferable to NO government, to a ſtate of rude nature, of anarchy and confuſion, where ſuperior ſtrength is the only law. And ſuch is preciſely the deciſion of the chriſtian ſcriptures; which, without entering into theſe perplexing ſubtelties concerning the origin of civil ſociety and the rights of man, and leaving every nation at liberty to chooſe its own particular form of government, authoritatively declare, "The powers that be"—"every ordinance of man"—every form of legal government to be "of God;" or, in other words, that the inſtitution of civil government, abſtractedly conſidered, without any reference to this or that particular form, is ſanctioned by His approbation and authority, and, from its

general beneficial effects on ſociety, entitled, not only to our ſubjection, but to our cheerful and conſcientious ſupport. But if every man may withdraw his allegiance from government, becauſe he does not think the form under which he lives the very beſt or moſt perfect of all; if every individual is to take upon himſelf to judge of the meaſures of government, and to withhold his quota of contribution to the ſtate whenever he diſapproves of them, every man becomes his own governor, and there is, in fact, no government at all. For a pure democracy, or government by the people, is a contradiction in terms.—There can be no government, where all are governors. The functions of government may be confined to a greater or leſs number of individuals, on whom may be conferred different degrees of authority, different offices, diſtinguiſhed by different titles or appellations; but the ſupreme right and power of making and executing the laws muſt remain ſomewhere, or elſe, I again repeat it, every man is his own governor, and this ordinance of God, the inſtitution of civil government is altogether annihilated! * Unleſs, therefore,

* In the government of Great Britain, this ſovereign and uncontroulable authority is veſted in parliament, conſiſting of King, Lords and Commons. "This being the place," ſays Blackſtone, "where the abſolute and deſpotic power, which muſt, in all governments, reſide ſomewhere, is intruſted by the conſtitution of theſe kingdoms. It can regulate or new model the ſucceſſion to the crown. It can change and create afreſh the conſtitution of the kingdom, as was done in the act of union."

every man is to be his own governor—if there ever was a legitimate government on earth, it is ſurely that under which we live; by the conſtitution of which it is provided, that the laws ſhall be enacted by men taken from among ourſelves (who are, in every reſpect, ſubject to the ſame laws which they impoſe upon others) and be executed without favour or partiality.

It would have been well for the unhappy monarch, whoſe lamented fate we this day commemorate, if he had better underſtood, or more carefully attended to, this important diſtinction between the power of the legiſlature (of which the regal is only one, although an eſſential branch) and the mere will of the executive magiſtrate. For—while we pity his miſguided though well-meant efforts for the preſervation of what he deemed to be, and applaud his zealous though ineffectual endeavours to maintain what really were, the juſt and neceſſary prerogatives of the crown, to which he died a martyr rather than ſurrender them; and while we reſolutely declare his death, accompliſhed by vile uſurpers, in direct violation of the law and of the conſtitution, to have been a moſt foul and atrocious murder—we do not defend all his meaſures, or affirm that he had a right, without and againſt the authority of parliament, to raiſe benevolences, ſhip-money, tonnage and poundage, or any other taxes whatever from the people. No,

my fellow-countrymen! The laws by which the ſubjects of this realm are, and have been governed for ages paſt, are not the arbitrary commands of the King, but are enacted, as I before obſerved (but it cannot too often be repeated,) by men choſen from among ourſelves, and, in every reſpect, SUBJECT TO THE SAME LAWS WHICH THEY IMPOSE UPON OTHERS.

To take, for example, the extraordinary meaſure which has juſt now received the ſanction of the legiſlature; the demand of a tenth of every perſon's income poſſeſſing more than 200l. a year, and a leſs proportion from others down to 60l. a year, towards the expences of the preſent juſt and neceſſary war. * Do we recollect, that the members of our Houſe of Commons, with whom it originated, and ſtill more the Peers, by whom it is ratified and confirmed, are men of the firſt property in the kingdom; who will conſequently bear, themſelves, the largeſt part of the burden, which, as far as human ſagacity can contrive, (at leaſt according to the beſt judgment of very ſkilful

* Under whatever circumſtances the war was begun, it is now become juſt; ſince the enemy has refuſed to treat, on equitable terms, for the reſtoration of peace. Under whatever circumſtances of expediency or inexpediency the war was commenced, its continuance is now become neceſſary: for what neceſſity can be greater than that which ariſes from the enemy having threatened us with deſtruction? *(Biſhop of Llandaff's Addreſs to the People.)*——Men and MONEY are the ſinews of war. *(Ibid.)*

and diligent financiers,) is diſtributed among all ranks of the community, except the very pooreſt of all, in proportion to their ſeveral abilities? But we are biaſſed in this matter by a narrow, ſhort-ſighted, partial regard to our own private intereſt. Many ſeem only to feel the preſent hardſhip of parting with ſome of the comforts and conveniencies of which they have had long and peaceable poſſeſſion, according to their reſpective ſtations in ſociety, and to forget, that without thoſe exertions of defence, to give efficacy to which ſome ſuch extraordinary means are abſolutely neceſſary, they might ſoon be deprived of every comfort and convenience, of that ſtation in ſociety, of every thing dear and valuable in life, and even of life itſelf, by the mad and deſperate aggreſſions of an implacable and ſanguinary foe to Britain, to ſocial order, and to chriſtianity.—Beſides, as nothing that makes for peace and unanimity among ourſelves can be improper to be mentioned from this place, on ſuch an occaſion as the preſent, let it not be objected to, if I remind you, even from the pulpit, of this one important particular which does not apply to any principle of duty or conſcience, but merely of worldly policy and prudence, viz. that by this meaſure we ſo far diſcharge, at once, the debt which would otherwiſe remain to be added to that which is already enormouſly great; and that no permanent taxes will be required to pay the annual intereſt of the millions to be raiſed by this aſſeſſment. A com-

mercial congregation will readily perceive the force of this obſervation.

Again: If biaſſed by the dictates of ſelf-love, we endeavour, as we naturally ſhall, to palliate to ourſelves the ſinfulneſs of a practice into which we may have been, perhaps, at firſt, inadvertently ſeduced, we ſhall doubtleſs be ready to aſk, when we obſerve others fraudulently withholding their juſt ſhare of contribution to the public expences of the ſtate, whether we are not warranted in doing the ſame, from a principle of retaliation, or of juſtice to ourſelves? It is certainly allowable, and even our duty, when in our power, to bring ſuch offenders to juſtice. The character of an informer is, in general, held in too much odium, from the wrong motives on which the office is frequently undertaken.—Why ſhould not this, as certainly as any other crime againſt civil ſociety, ſubject the perſon who commits it to the penalties provided by the laws of that ſociety? But we muſt not take the law into our own hands. Becauſe a man ſteals a crown out of my pocket, am I, therefore, to reimburſe myſelf by ſtealing a like ſum from any other perſon? May I revenge, or do juſtice to myſelf, or others, for any crime whatever, by committing the ſame crime?

But we ſhall probably be inclined to aſk further, if that can really be ſo great a crime,

which we have reaſon to believe is committed with ſuch frequency and unconcern, by many in all ranks and conditions of life? The anſwer to this queſtion has already been given in a former part of this diſcourſe. It is ſurely the moſt obvious truth in the world, that if a thing is in itſelf, in its own nature, wrong, the example of thouſands, or even of the whole world, cannot make any alteration in its nature, or change in its inherent turpitude. The relative perſonal culpability, indeed, of thoſe who commit THIS offence, will vary according to the degree in which they offend againſt greater knowledge and conviction, with greater deliberation, to a greater extent, with inferior temptations, and, as I have more than once mentioned already, various other contingent circumſtances. But, undoubtedly, that ſtate of ſociety muſt be very corrupt and depraved in which a direct breach of common honeſty, a flagrant fraud on our neighbour's property, an undeniable ſpecies of theft or robbery is countenanced, by the practice of it being general, or widely prevalent:—ſuch practice implicating, moſt aſſuredly, no ſmall degree of moral depravity in each and every individual, before he can be brought to approve and adopt it, and being, beyond all controverſy, injurious to ſociety at large, looſening the very foundations on which the whole intercourſe and harmony of ſociety is eſtabliſhed—mutual truſt and confidence, and reciprocal aſſiſtance and protection.

And can it be doubted—unleſs, indeed, we are ſtrangely influenced by the prejudice of mere opinion—can it, I ſay, be doubted, that the practice of which we are now ſpeaking, the withholding our juſt ſhare of contribution to the public expences of the ſtate, is (what I have juſt now termed it) a direct breach of common honeſty, a flagrant fraud on our neighbours' property, an undeniable ſpecies of theft or robbery? Let us conſider. If a certain ſupply is neceſſary to be, and, therefore, is raiſed for the general purpoſes of government, whatever part I withhold of my juſt ſhare of contribution, I muſt conſequently throw that proportion of the burden on others more conſcientious than myſelf. On whom, indeed, I know not. But does this make the leaſt alteration in my diſhoneſty? I would not, for the world, wrong any ONE of my neighbours or fellow-countrymen of ſuch or ſuch a ſpecific ſum; ſay, for example, five pounds. But is it leſs a fraud if I cheat an hundred of them of a ſhilling each, or four thouſand eight hundred of them of a farthing, which would amount to the ſame value? The whole of the injuſtice is ſtill the ſame: the ſmallneſs of the injury which each ſuſtains being exactly counterballanced by the number to whom it extends. And if I know not on whom the loſs may fall, eſpecially if it be ſure to light on thoſe who are readieſt to pay whatever is demanded of them—is it not yet, on my

part, an undeniable ſpecies of theft or robbery?* Is the property of government leſs ſacred than that of private individuals? If ſo, the unhappy ſoldier, who is now detained in priſon for a robbery of the mint, without having been neceſſitated to injure the perſon of any one, ought not to be puniſhed with ſeverity.—Are they not guilty, in their ſeveral proportions, of preciſely the ſame crime, who ſteal from the public purſe, by withholding their juſt ſhare of contribution to the public expences? And what, after all, is the public purſe or treaſury, but the aggregate of the property of private individuals, intruſted into the hands of adminiſtration †—for general protection and ſecurity—for the maintenance of the laws, and of thoſe who contrive and execute them—the payment of our gallant defenders by ſea and land—and all the purpoſes of civil government, of which, as all partake of the beneficial and ſalutary effects, none are exempt from the obligation of contributing to their ſupport? And, as I have already ſufficiently proved, unleſs every man is to be his own governor, the manner and proportion in which each perſon ſhall contribute muſt be de-

* Theſe obſervations *(mutatis mutandis)* will equally apply to the payment of poor rates and all parochial taxes.

† When ſpeaking of the money borrowed by government for public uſe, we are ready enough to call it, by its proper name, the *national* debt.

termined, not by himſelf, but by the ſupreme authority of the legiſlature.

But it cannot be denied, that we are wont to be ſtrangely influenced in this matter by the prejudice of opinion, and even by the ſound of a word. The word "Tax" is generally aſſociated in our minds with ſome idea of fine or puniſhment: than which nothing is more improper or abſurd. Taxes, indeed, have often been impoſed on articles of luxury, as furniſhing a good criterion of the ability of the conſumer to afford aſſiſtance to the ſtate, and as obliging every one to give aſſiſtance in proportion to the pleaſures and comforts which he enjoys under the protection of that ſtate. But few, if any, are intended as prohibitory, fines or puniſhments. The rate upon windows, for example, is not a tax on the light of heaven, but merely a probable, though not infallibly equal meaſure of the owner's rank in life and relative property. If a tax could be invented, conſiſtent with the ſacred privacy of perſonal concerns, impoſing on every one in exact proportion to their reſpective poſſeſſions, with due allowance for the number of children and other inſeparable claims on their expenditure, this would certainly be the faireſt and moſt equitable of all. And I think it is generally agreed, that the meaſure lately adopted approaches nearer to this than any that have been attempted of late years.

A tax then is no other than the demand of "tribute to whom tribute is due," in return for protection and all the comforts and advantages of civil ſociety—(the ineſtimable value of which we do not ſufficiently conſider, becauſe we ſeldom feel the want of them, the want of legal protection, or the impreſſion of foreign invaſions)—and in no ſenſe whatever a fine or puniſhment. If, indeed, by our luxurious and extravagant habits of living, or by the unavoidable temporary obſtruction of commerce or other ſources of wealth in time of war, we are put to inconvenience to raiſe the ſum demanded of us for the purpoſes of government, this ſerves to ſtrengthen the falſe aſſociation above mentioned. "We ſee not why we ſhould pay to the king or his miniſters, living in affluence and plenty, what we can ſo hardly ſpare."

Here again we are deceived by the ſound of a word. We call that the king's money which is, in fact, the property of the nation. He has only his ſtated ſalary, paid out of the general fund. And even this, which commonly goes by the name of the civil liſt, is not left at his own diſpoſal. The ſalaries of his ſervants, paid out of this ſum, are fixed by the laws. And if ſome of theſe appear great and enormous in our eyes; if we would remember the inconceivable trouble and high reſponſibility attaching to many of theſe, and that others

may properly be conſidered as prizes for the exciting a laudable emulation, or as the rewards of ſuperior merit and abilities in the immediate poſſeſſors or their anceſtors; if we would further reflect on the propriety and neceſſity of beſtowing on the chief officers of the ſtate the exterior means of reſpectability and conſideration; and if, above all, we would calculate how very ſmall and contemptible a ſaving it would be to each of us, if the whole catalogue of penſions and places were aboliſhed, and (what we have no right to expect, and would not be any benefit but an injury to the nation) the whole duty of the executive department were done without fee or reward—we ſhould be aſhamed to urge theſe objections, ſo long as we were perſuaded that the great bulk of the revenue of our country was expended with prudence and œconomy, and that the extraordinary occaſions for theſe extraordinary demands aroſe, not from the folly and wickedneſs of our rulers, but from imperious and unavoidable neceſſity: or rather (whatever be our own private opinion) ſo long as the nation at large continued to eſteem them worthy of their confidence and ſupport.

That our preſent rulers are reciprocally perſuaded, on their part, not only that they deſerve but poſſeſs this confidence, appears from hence, viz. that, by the late act of parliament, it is left, in the firſt inſtance, to every man's honour or conſcience to give in an

account of his own income, without requiring "an oath for confirmation," till there appear ſome reaſonable and ſufficient grounds of ſuſpicion. And ſurely, my brethren, unleſs we have ſinned ourſelves out of our ſenſes, and can be prevailed upon by the doctrines of the new philoſophy, by the dictates of ſelf-love, the cuſtom of the world, or the prejudice of opinion, to believe that we may ſafely and honeſtly call God to witneſs what we know to be a lie, we ſhall not, for the ſake of a few pounds, "lay perjury upon our ſouls," and hazard their future and eternal ſalvation.

So far from this—the zeal and ſpirit with which all ranks of perſons united during the laſt year in the meaſure of "Voluntary Contributions," UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF PARLIAMENT, giving, in many inſtances, far more than the ſum that was demanded of them, leave us no room to doubt, but that Britons—eſpecially thoſe who pretend to more than ordinary loyalty * and attachment to

* LOYALTY (*loyauté*) from the French word *loi*, is obedience to the laws. Notwithſtanding all that has been urged againſt this definition (See Gentleman's Magazine for September, 1798, page 785) I am ſtill perſuaded that *loyalty* and *allegiance* are nearly ſynonimous terms, and, with their adjectives, *loyal* and *liege*, were originally derived from one and the ſame root, (probably from *ligo*, *to bind*:) and that, if not the "ſole," this is really the "primary" and proper "meaning of the word." And though I entirely aſſent to the opinion of a reſpectable writer (with which I could have furniſhed Mr. Urban's Reviewer) that "When words

their king and conſtitution—being at length aroufed to a due ſenſe of their duty and of their danger, will conſcientiouſly obey the calls of their country: and as their enemies avowedly

are reſtrained by common uſage to a particular ſenſe, it is wretchedly ridiculous to run up to etymology, and conſtrue them by dictionary;" yet I contend, that the doctrine here advanced, ſo far from being "Jeſuitical and dangerous," is a truth moſt obvious, undeniable and unſophiſticated, and, in the preſent times, highly important and neceſſary to be inculcated. "A loyal man," this Reviewer obſerves, "denotes a friend to monarchy: and when, ſpeaking of an Engliſhman, we ſay he is loyal, we mean he is a dutiful ſubject of King George." Can a perſon, then, be a *dutiful* ſubject of King George who does not obey the laws of his king and country? Nay, I will further allow, that no man can be a loyal *Britiſh* ſubject who is not attached to a limited monarchy. For are not the regal office and authority an eſſential part of the *law* of this land? Was I not ſpeaking, excluſively, of Engliſhmen? Is it not, therefore, downright quibbling or "equivocating" to ſay, "That a man is a loyal man becauſe he pays obedience to the laws of another country?" But are there not many ſubjects of *this* realm who lay claim to more than ordinary loyalty and attachment to the preſent king and conſtitution, who are notoriouſly diſobedient to the laws of that conſtitution, by which it is the glory of Britiſh kings to reign? In a former diſcourſe, I endeavoured ſeriouſly to preſs this argument on the attention of thoſe perſons who pretend to great abhorrence of French principles and practices, and yet are following hard after their pernicious example, in the flagrant violation of the Lord's Day, and neglect of the public ordinances of religion, which, I obſerved, were "equally enforced by the law of God and the law of the land." In this place I maintain, with equal earneſtneſs, that however loud any perſon may be in his profeſſions of loyalty, unleſs he conſcientiouſly obey the laws of the Britiſh legiſlature, and cheerfully contribute, according to thoſe laws, a due proportion of his ſubſtance to the public expences of the ſtate, he cannot, whatever he may ſuppoſe, have any pretenſions to the character of a dutiful ſubject or the name of a

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profeſs their hopes of gradually accompliſhing their ruin by the diſtreſs of their finances, which they have in vain attempted by the proweſs of their arms—they will, "for this cauſe," cheerfully "pay tribute alſo," not only a tenth, but any proportion whatever of their ſubſtance, rather than reſign the whole, together with their independence and their religion, to the plunderers of Europe, the diſturbers of the peace and happineſs of the whole world!

THE END.